is paper provides security evaluations of a lightweight block cipher called BORON proposed by Bansod et al. ere is no thirdparty cryptanalysis towards BORON. Designers only provided coarse and simple security analysis. To ll this gap, security bounds of BORON against di erential and linear cryptanalysis are presented in this paper. By automatic models based on the SMT solver STP, we search for di erential and linear trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes and trails with optimal probability and bias. en, we present key-recovery attacks towards round-reduced BORON. is paper is the rst third-party cryptanalysis towards BORON.
Introduction
Lightweight cryptography is one of the most actively discussed topics in the current cryptographic community. For the last decade, a great number of lightweight block ciphers have been proposed, such as PRESENT [1] , CLEFIA [2] , PRINCE [3] , SIMON [4] , SPECK [4] , SKINNY [5] , GIFT [6] , QARMA [7] , and so on, which draw plenty of researchers' attention.
Meanwhile, there are some unknown lightweight block ciphers. BORON [8] is one of them. BORON, a substitutionpermutation network cipher, supports 64-bit messages and 80/128-bit keys, which has a total of 25 rounds. e substitution layer is made up of 16 same 4-bit S-Boxes, and the permutation layer includes nibble shift, bit rotation, and block XOR operation.
Except for simple security analysis illustrated by designers, there is no third-party security evaluation in the open literature. To ll this gap, di erential [9] and linear cryptanalysis [10] towards BORON are presented in this paper. Di erential and linear cryptanalysis are one of the most fundamental and powerful techniques for security evaluations of cryptographic primitives.
Di erential cryptanalysis discusses how di erences propagate through the objective cryptographic primitives. If input di erences and output di erences occur in some regular patterns, these could be used to build distinguishers or even to recover secret keys.
Linear cryptanalysis focuses on the linear equation between plaintexts, ciphertexts, and keys. If this linear equation happens with a high probability, the distinguishing attack or key-recovery attack could be presented. erefore, nding good distinguishers is the rst step to evaluate security against di erential and linear cryptanalysis.
ere are many methods to nd di erential and linear trails, such as Matsui's algorithm, SAT/SMT and MILP, which are widely used to analyse the security of cryptographic primitives [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . In this paper, we utilize the SMT solver STP (http://stp.github.io) to search for good trails, which is suitable for dealing with bit vectors.
Contributions.
is paper analyses the security of BO-RON against di erential and linear cryptanalysis. Security bounds are depicted in Table 1 . e minimal number of active S-boxes of di erential and linear trails could describe approximate security bounds resistance to di erential and linear cryptanalysis. We nd that the minimal number of active S-boxes proposed by designers is incorrect and intact. en, differential and linear trails with the accurate minimal number of active S-boxes are found. Our results are listed in Table 2 .
We also search for (related-key) differential and linear trails with the optimal probability and bias. Details about the optimal probability and bias are illustrated in Table 3 . Specific trails with the optimal probability and bias are listed in Tables4-6. We figure out that there is no effective 9-round differential trail and 10-round linear trail. We also try to find impossible differential trails of BORON, and 7-round BO-RON impossible differential trails are obtained.
Utilizing the 8-round differential trail with the optimal probability of 2 − 62 , we depict a key-recovery attack towards 9round BORON with the 80-bit key schedule, whose time complexity is 2 56 , data complexity is 2 63 , and memory complexity is 2 24 . By the 9-round linear trail with the optimal bias of 2 − 30 , a key-recovery attack towards 11-round BORON with the 128-bit key schedule is described, whose time complexity is 2 123 , data complexity is 2 63 , and memory complexity is 2 42 .
And, in this paper, we assume that BORON is the Markov cipher.
Outline.
is paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the description of BORON. In Section 3, automatic models for finding trials are illustrated. Key-recovery attacks towards BORON are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Description of BORON
2.1. Encryption Algorithm. BORON is a 25-round SPN block cipher, whose message length is 64-bit and the key length is 80-bit or 128-bit. e round function of BORON is made up of Substitution Layer and Permutation Layer.
e Substitution Layer consists of 16 same 4-bit S-boxes in parallel. e S-box is described in Table 7 . e Permutation Layer includes three parts, nibble shift, bit rotation, and block XOR operation. And, the round function is described in Figure 1 . For more details, refer [8] .
In Figure 1 , we regard 4 bits as a nibble and 16 bits as a block. Note that nibble shift is the permutation between nibbles, while bit rotation and block XOR operation are ones in term of blocks.
Key Schedule.
e key schedule of BORON is inspired by the one of PRESENT [1] . ere are two versions, 80-bit and 128-bit. In total, 26 subkeys are generated by the key schedule in the whole procedure of encryption. Each subkey has 64 bits.
For the 80-bit version, the master key could be stored in a key register and denoted as K � k 79 k 78 . . . k 0 . First, extract the least significant 64 bits of the master key as the first subkey, that is, the whitening key K 0 � k 63 k 62 . . . k 0 . In the jth round (j � 0, 1, . . . , 24), after extracting the least significant 64 bits, the key register is updated as follows:
(3) k 63 ‖k 62 ‖k 61 ‖k 60 ‖k 59 ⟵ (k 63 ‖k 62 ‖k 61 ‖k 60 ‖k 59 ) ⊕ j For the 128-bit version, the master key could be stored in a key register and denoted as K � k 127 k 126 . . . k 0 . Extract the least significant 64 bits of the master key as the first subkey, that is, the whitening key K 0 � k 63 k 62 . . . k 0 . In the jth round (j � 0, 1, . . . , 24), after extracting the least significant 64 bits, the key register is updated as follows:
(4) k 63 ‖k 62 ‖k 61 ‖k 60 ‖k 59 ⟵ (k 63 ‖k 62 ‖k 61 ‖k 60 ‖k 59 ) ⊕ j
Automatic Models for Searching Trails
In this paper, we use STP [16] , an SMT solver, to search for good differential and linear trails. STP uses CVC and SMTLIB2 languages to encode constraints and then invokes an SAT solver to check for the satisfiability of these constraints. In this paper, the CVC language is used to encode difference and linear mask propagations of BORON. Related-key differential 10-round ---- Inspired by models in [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [17] [18] [19] [20] , we present automatic models for finding differential and linear trails of BORON. All intermediate states of BORON are represented by variables which are used to build constraints. Searching for good trails is transformed into checking for the satisfiability of constraints. For different searching problems, there are different constraints. We show constraints for all operations used in BORON as follows.
3.1. Finding Differential Trails. First, we give some notations about variables. We count from the right side and zero.
(i) before_sbox_vaule1_i_j: input value of the jth Sbox in the ith round (ii) after_sbox_vaule1_i_j: output value of the jth Sbox in the ith round whose input value is before_sbox_vaule1_i_j (iii) before_sbox_vaule2_i_j: input value of the jth Sbox in the ith round Table 4 : Differential trails with the optimal probability.
Round Input difference of S-box Output difference of S-box 3-round differential trail with probability 2 − 12 0 0x0000000800000200 0x0000000C00000300 1 0x0000000000000006 0x0000000000000008 2 0x1000100000001000 0xA000A0000000A000 3 0x1141514040014141 -4-round differential trail with probability 2 − 19 0 0xA0000009000F0000 0x4000000100080000 1 0x0000800000000000 0x0000C00000000000 2 0x6000600000000000 0x2000800000000000 3 0x0000400040004000 0x0000900090007000 4 0x48E048E0090009E0 -5-round differential trail with probability 2 − 28 0 0x0000002009000F00 0x0000003001000800 1 0x0008000800100000 0x0003000C00600000 2 0x0000000600000000 0x0000000E00000000 3 0x0007000700000000 0x0001000400000000 4 0x0000000200020002 0x00000003000B0005 5 0x8A018A01B000BA00 -6-round differential trail with probability 2 − 38 0 0x09000A0030080000 0x01000400200C0000 1 0x00000200C000C000 0x0000030010008000 2 0x0080008001000000 0x003000C006000000 3 0x0000006000000000 0x000000C000000000 4 0x0060006000000000 0x0020008000000000 5 0x0000004000400040 0x0000009000700090 6 0x2049204900072006 -7-round differential trail with probability 2 − 51  0  0xB000A00000230000  0x1000400000520000  1  0x0000200000050005  0x0000300000010008  2  0x0800080010000000  0x03000C0060000000  3  0x0000060000000000  0x00000A0000000000  4  0x0500050000000000  0x03000C0000000000  5  0x0000060006000600  0x0000080008000800  6  0x0410041000800090  0x07A007A000F00010  7 0x2C9023D00F4F2F4F -8-round differential trail with probability 2 − 62  0  0x0000080000100000  0x00000C0000F00000  1  0x06000600000F000F  0x08000E00000E0008  2  0x07001700F000E000  0x0400F10080004000  3  0x7000780000000080  0x60001C0000000060  4  0x0E00CE00C0000000  0x06001800C0000000  5  0x00000C0000000000  0x0000010000000000  6  0x0080008000000000  0x003000C000000000  7  0x0000006000600060  0x0000008000800080  8 0x0041004100080009 - 0  0xD0000D00000D000D  0x4000080000080002  1  0x0000040080000000  0x00000A0050000000  2  0x0500000000000500  0x0300000000000300  3  0x0600060000060006  0x0B000C0000010003  4  0x0600000010000000  0x06000000C0000000  5  0x000000000C000000  0x0000000005000000  6  0x0050005000500000  0x0070007000300000  8-round linear trail with bias 2 − 27  0  0x00000D00F0000000  0x0000020010000000  1  0x0100000000000100  0x0700000000000300  2  0x0E000E0000060006  0x0800040000010001  3  0x0000020010000000  0x00000E0070000000  4  0x0700000000000700  0x0100000000000300  5  0x0200020000060006  0x0B000C0000010003  6  0x0600000010000000  0x06000000C0000000  7 0x000000000C000000 0x0000000005000000 9-round linear trail with bias 2 − 30  0  0x0000000F000D0000  0x0000000100080000  1  0x8000000000008000  0x5000000000007000  2  0xA000A00000E000E0  0x8000400000100010  3  0x0000200000010000  0x0000E00000070000  4  0x7000000000007000  0x1000000000003000  5  0x2000200000600060  0xB000C00000100030  6  0x6000000000010000  0x60000000000C0000  7  0x00000000C0000000  0x0000000070000000  8 0x0700070007000000 0x010001000C000000
(iv) after_sbox_vaule2_i_j: output value of the jth Sbox in the ith round whose input value is before_sbox_vaule2_i_j Table 6 : Related-key differential trails with the optimal probability.
Round Subkey difference
Input difference of S-box Output difference of S-box 4-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 2  0  0x0020000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  1  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  2  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  3 0x0000000000001000 0x0000000000001000 0x000000000000F000 5-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 6  0  0x0000004000000000  0x000A000000F00000  0x0004000000800000  1  0x0008000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  2  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  3  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  4 0x0000000000000400 0x0000000000000400 0x0000000000000900 6-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 15 0 0x0000004000000000 0x000A000000600000 0x0004000000800000 1 0x0008000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 2 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 3 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 4 0x0000000000000400 0x0000000000000400 0x0000000000000500 5 0x0000000000800000 0x000A000A0080000A 0x0004000F00C00004 7-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 27 0 0x0000000002000000 0x003200A003102000 0x0025004002A03000 1 0x0000004000000000 0x000A000000600000 0x0004000000800000 2 0x0008000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 3 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 4 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 5 0x0000000000000400 0x0000000000000400 0x0000000000000500 6 0x0000000000800000 0x000A000A0080000A 0x000F000400C0000F 8-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 40  0  0x0000000002000000  0x003200A003102000  0x0025004002A03000  1  0x0000004000000000  0x000A000000600000  0x0004000000800000  2  0x0008000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  3  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  4  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  5  0x0000000000000400  0x0000000000000400  0x0000000000000700  6  0x0000000000800000  0x000E000E0080000E  0x0003000D00600008  7 0x0000001000000000 0x9000901600001000 0x100090F80000F000 9-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 48  0  0x0000010000000000  0x00B0000003000000  0x0010000002000000  1  0x0020000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  2  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  3  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  4  0x0000000000001000  0x0000000000001000  0x0000000000006000  5  0x0000000002000000  0x00C000C0020000C0  0x0050008003000070  6  0x0000004000000000  0xE0E0E0000090E090  0x8030400000103010  7  0x0008000000000000  0x0009006000602000  0x000400C000803000  8 0x0000000000000000 0x0008000000000060 0x000F0000000000E0 10-round related-key differential trail with probability 2 − 55  0  0x0000010000000000  0x00B0000003000000  0x0010000002000000  1  0x0020000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  2  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  3  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000  4  0x0000000000001000  0x0000000000001000  0x0000000000006000  5  0x0000000002000000  0x00C000C0020000C0  0x0050008003000070  6  0x0000004000000000  0xE0E0E0000090E090  0x8070400000107010  7  0x0008000000000000  0x000900E000E02000  0x000400D000803000  8  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000800000060  0x00000003000000C0  9 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000008001 0x000000000000C00F 
Substitution Layer. Constraints built in Algorithm 4 describe di erence propagations through S-boxes, which include initializing variables by values of S-boxes and showing relationships among variables.
Other constraints should be added in Algorithm 4, when searching for di erential trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes. ese constraints of searching for the minimal number of active S-boxes are illustrated in Algorithm 5. e variable ag_i_j is used to explain whether an Sbox is active or not. When the jth S-box in the ith round is active, flag _ i _ j 1; otherwise, flag _ i _ j 0.
We need to check whether total _ num n is satis ed or not under constraints from Algorithm 4 and 5, where n is the expected number of active S-boxes in the whole di erential trail, and total _ num n is regarded as the objective constraints.
We rst search for 3-round trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes, and set n 1. Put all constraints including Algorithm 1-5 into STP and check the satisfaction of these objective constraints. If STP returns invalid, gradually adjust the value of n by adding 1 till STP returns a trail. When searching for r-round trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes, we set the value of n equal to the minimal number of active S-boxes of (r − 1)-round trails. Repeat the above steps.
When searching for the optimal di erential trail, we need to consider probabilities of di erence propagations through S-boxes. Probabilities of S-boxes could be described by the di erence distribution table (DDT).
For any input di erence x and output di erence y of the S-box, the probability of the S-box, named p _ sbox(x, y), is equal to the corresponding value in the DDT divided by 16, which is
We can write that p _ sbox(x, y) 2 − probability(x,y) . In our model, we use the parameter probability(x, y) to present the probability of the S-box and
Values of probability(x, y) for all x and y are stored in a table called Di _dist.
Denote the probability of the whole di erential trail as 2 − total _ probability and total _ probability i r,j 15 i 0,j 0 probability _ i _ j.
(
e parameter total_probability is used to represent the probability of the whole trail in the constraints. Constraints of nding the optimal di erential trail are presented in Algorithm 6.
Let that the value of total_probability starts from doubling the minimal number of active S-boxes because 
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consider probabilities of all active S-boxes in the trail are optimal. Adjust the value of total_probability by adding 1 till obtaining the trail with the optimal probability.
Finding Linear
Trails. Due to differences between difference propagations and linear mask propagations, we need to build constraints suitable for tracking linear masks in all operations of BORON. Notations are given as follows:
(i) before_sbox_mask_i_j: input mask of the jth S-box in the ith round r: the number of rounds (1) It is little complicated that linear masks propagate through block XOR operation due to the property of linear masks. Detailed constraints are described in Algorithm 7. Figure 2 illustrates the variables which are used in tracking linear masks through block XOR operation.
Substitution
Layer. Similar to finding differential trails, we also use flag_i_j to represent whether an S-box is active or not when finding linear trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes. And, the objective constraint is total _ num � n, where n is the expected number of active Sboxes in the whole linear trail. e choice of n is the same as above. Detailed constraints are illustrated in Algorithm 8.
When searching for the optimal linear trail, we need to consider biases of S-boxes which could be described by the linear approximation table (LAT).
For any input mask α and output mask ß of the S-box, the bias of the S-box, named b _ sbox(α, β) is equal to the corresponding value in the LAT divided by 16, which is
We can write that b _ sbox(α, β) � 2 − bias(α,β) . Use the parameter bias(α, β) to present the bias of the Sbox in the constraints and r: the number of rounds S[x]: output of the S-box with the input x (1) for i ⟵ 1 to r do (2) for j ⟵ 0 to 15 do
end for (7) end for (8) end for (9) (10) for i ⟵ 1 to r do (11) for j ⟵ 0 to 15 do (12) before_sbox_difference_i_j (13) � before_sbox_value1_i_j ⊕ before_sbox_value2_i_j (14) after_sbox_difference_i_j (15) � after_sbox_value1_i_j ⊕ after_sbox_value2_i_j (16) end for (17) r: the number of rounds n: the expected number of active S-boxes in the whole trail (1) for i ⟵ 1 to r do
flag_i_j � 0 (5) else (6) flag_i_j � 1 (7) end if (8) end for (9) end for (10) (11) total _ num � i�r,j�15 i�0,j�0 flag _ i _ j (12) (13) total _ num � n ALGORITHM 5: Finding differential trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes. 
4) end for (5) end for (6) (7) for i ⟵ 1 to r do (8) for j ⟵ 0 to 4 do (9) xor _ i _ j _ up � xor _ i _ j _ down � xor _ i _ j _ another (10) end for (11) end for (12) (13) for i ⟵ 1 to r do (14) branch _ i _ 0 _ another � xor _ i _ 2 _ another (15) branch _ i _ 1 _ another � xor _ i _ 0 _ another (16) Security and Communication Networks
Constraints of nding linear trails with the optimal bias are presented in Algorithm 9.
Set the initial value of total_bias by considering all Sboxes with the optimal bias. Adjust the value of total_bias by adding 1 till obtaining the trail with the optimal bias.
Finding Related-Key Di erential Trails.
When searching for di erential trails in related-key setting, some constraints are given in Algorithm 10 to illustrate the related-key relationship. And we also need to construct some constraints which describe di erence propagations through the key schedule. Operations in the key schedule are similar to those in the encryption algorithm and constraints could refer to Algorithm 2, 3, and 6.
Detailed codes are presented in the GitHub and the optimal trails are illustrated in Table 6 .
Finding Impossible Di erential Trails.
In order to nd impossible di erential trails, we need to set the pattern of input and output di erences and check the satisfaction of constraints. If the solver returns a trail, there is no impossible di erential trail under this pattern. If returns invalid, an impossible differential trails are found. Constraints are listed in Algorithm 11.
As a result, we obtain 4 di erent 7-round impossible di erential trails, which are 0x0000000000010000 ⟶ 0x0001000000000000, 0x0000000000100000 ⟶ 0x0010000000000000, 0x0000000001000000 ⟶ 0x0100000000000000, 0x0000000010000000 ⟶ 0x1000000000000000.
(7)
e former is the input pattern, and the latter is the output pattern of the 7-round BORON, where "1" represents the active nibble and "0" represents the inactive nibble. Table 4 , a key-recovery attack towards 9-round BORON is presented in the following by adding one more round on the tail of the distinguisher. We omit the permutation layer of the last round due to linearity. We adopt the 80-bit key schedule in this key-recovery attack.
Key-Recovery Attacks
e input di erence of this distinguisher is 0x0000080000100000, and the output di erence is 0x0041004100080009. We choose 2 62 plaintext pairs whose di erences are equal to 0x0000080000100000. Filter these plaintext pairs and keep ones whose ciphertext di erences are equal to 0x00??00??000?000?, where ? represents the ag_i_j 0 (5) else (6) ag_i_j 1 (7) end if (8) end for (9) end for (10) (11) total _ num i r,j 15 i 0,j 0 flag _ i _ j (12) (13) total_num n unknown difference. On average, 2 22 plaintext pairs are left because the probability that a pair satisfies the limitation of this distinguisher is 2 − 40 .
Guess 24 bits of subkey K 9 including k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 16 For the right candidate subkey, one plaintext pair satisfies the distinguisher. However, for wrong candidate subkeys, 2 − 24 plaintext pair satisfies the distinguisher on average. We pick the candidate subkey whose counter is maximum as the right subkey. e time complexity is 2 46 , the memory complexity is 2 24 , and the data complexity is 2 63 .
For the 80-bit master key, we have already guessed 24 bits. To obtain the left 56 bits, we use a brute-force search. e time complexity is 2 56 . e memory and data complexity could be omitted.
Hence, we give a key-recovery attack towards 9-round BORON with time complexity 2 56 , memory complexity 2 24 , and data complexity 2 63 .
We use the method in [21] to evaluate the success probability of this attack. e success probability P S is computed as follows:
where μ � pN, p is the probability of the differential trail, N is the number of plaintext pairs, a is the advantage, and S N is the signal-to-noise ratio. In our differential cryptanalysis,
Linear Cryptanalysis.
Based on the 9-round optimal linear trail listed in Table 5 , we could present a key-recovery attack against 11-round BORON by linking one more round at the head and tail of this 9-round linear trail. e number of plaintexts required in the key-recovery attack is equal to cε − 2 , where ε is the bias of the linear approximation and c is a constant [10] . Set c � 8, and then we need 2 63 plaintexts to achieve this attack and the success probability of this attack is 96.7%.
We need to guess 28 bits of subkey K 0 and 24 bits of subkey K 11 . Considering the 128-bit key schedule, there are 10 same bits between K 0 and K 11 . In total, we need to guess 42 bits to obtain 5-bit key information. is key-recovery attack requires 2 63 · 2 42 � 2 105 one-round encryptions, which is equivalent to 2 101.54 11-round encryptions. e left 123 bits need to be searched by brute-force.
Hence, the time complexity is 2 123 , memory complexity is 2 42 , and data complexity is 2 63 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the first third-party cryptanalysis of the lightweight block cipher BORON against differential and linear cryptanalysis. By the automatic tool, we search for differential and linear trails with the minimal number of active S-boxes and trails with the optimal probability and bias. Considering the optimal trails as distinguishers, we mount key-recovery attacks. Utilizing the 8-round differential trail with the optimal probability 2 − 62 , we give a key-recovery attack towards 9-round BORON whose time complexity is 2 56 , data complexity is 2 63 , and memory complexity is 2 24 . By the 9-round linear trail with the optimal bias 2 − 30 , we describe the key-recovery attack towards 11-round BORON whose time complexity is 2 123 , data complexity is 2 63 , and memory complexity is 2 42 . Besides differential and linear cryptanalysis, there are other powerful cryptanalysis techniques. Further security evaluations could be made in future work.
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